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Background and Objectives: The cognitive theory of compulsive checking in OCD proposes that 
checking behaviour is maintained by maladaptive beliefs, including those related to inflated 
responsibility and those related to reduced memory c nfidence. This study examined whether 
and when specific interventions (as part of a new cognitive therapy for compulsive checking) 
addressing these cognitive targets changed feelings of responsibility and memory confidence. 
Methods: Participants were nine adults with a primay or secondary diagnosis of OCD who 
reported significant checking symptoms (at least one hour per day) on the Yale-Brown 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale. A single-case multiple baseline design was used, after which 
participants received 12 sessions of cognitive therapy. From the start of the baseline period 
through to the 1 month post-treatment follow-up asses ment session, participants completed 
daily monitoring of feelings of responsibility, memory confidence, and their time spent engaging 
in compulsive checking. 
Results: Results revealed that feelings of responsibility significantly reduced and memory 
confidence significantly increased from baseline to immediately post-treatment, with very high 
effect sizes. Multilevel modelling revealed significant linear changes in feelings of responsibility 
(i.e., reductions over time) and memory confidence (i.e., increases over time) occurred following 
the sessions when these were addressed. Finally, we found that improvements in these over the 
course of the treatment significantly predicted reduced time spent checking. 
Limitations: The small sample size limits our ability to generalize our results. 
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When it’s at: An examination of when cognitive change occurs during cognitive therapy 
 Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterized by recurrent obsessions and/or 
compulsions that are time-consuming (lasting at least one hour per day) and cause marked 
distress and/or significant impairment in functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
It is a common psychiatric disorder, estimated to affect 0.5 to 3.5% of the population (Angst et 
al., 2004; Grabe et al., 2000; Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, & Kessler, 2010), and the associated impact on 
quality of life (e.g., impaired work functioning and family dysfunction; Norberg, Calamari, 
Cohen, & Riemann, 2008) has led OCD to be considered a highly disabling condition (Bobes et 
al., 2001; Murray, Lopez, & World Health Organization, 1996). 
 Compulsive checking is the most common form of OCD; in a study by Foa et al. (2005), 
compulsive checking was the most prevalent compulsion and was reported by 28.8% of patients, 
followed closely by compulsive washing (26.5%). Although a majority of individuals with OCD 
engage in checking behaviour, compulsive checking is commonly understood as extreme and 
often incapacitating attempts to reduce distress by preventing harm from occurring to oneself 
and/or others. Typical examples include repeatedly checking that potentially threatening objects 
(e.g., kitchen appliances) are safe, frequently re-tracing the route that one has driven to confirm 
that one has not killed or injured a pedestrian, and repetitively checking that the doors and 
windows are securely closed. Importantly, compulsive checking can be immensely time 
consuming (Radomsky, Shafran, Coughtrey, & Rachman, 2010), requiring hours to complete 
each day, which is frustrating for the individual (s well as their friends and family) and 
significantly disrupts their everyday functioning. 
 The cognitive theory of compulsive checking was proposed by Rachman (2002) as an 














compulsive checking is maintained. According to this t eory, three cognitive components cause 
compulsive checking and are therefore targets for treatment: a) inflated estimates/perceptions of 
the probability of a misfortune (e.g., that a fire is likely to be caused by a stove), b) inflated 
estimates/perceptions of the s riousness of the predicted misfortune (e.g., that a fire caused by a 
stove will do serious and significant damage), and c) an inflated sense of personal responsibility 
(e.g., that the individual feels personally responsible in preventing the fire from occurring). 
Inflated responsibility is proposed to amplify estimates/perceptions of the probability and 
seriousness of the feared misfortune and is therefore a key target of treatment (Rachman, 2002). 
The theory then proposes that the checking behaviour caused by these cognitive components 
paradoxically increases feelings of responsibility, reduces confidence in one’s memory for the 
check (which in turn leads to negative beliefs about memory; Alcolado & Radomsky, 2016) and 
impairs attention, which promotes further checking thereby maintaining compulsive checking in 
a self-perpetuating cycle. As such, memorial distrust and impaired attention are also targets of 
treatment. 
 Empirical support for this model has accumulated over the years, although the current 
manuscript will focus only on two of its components: inflated responsibility and memory 
distrust. Following its initial identification by Salkovskis (1985), the role of inflated 
responsibility in compulsive checking has received wi e support (e.g., Arntz, Voncken, & 
Goosen, 2007; Haring, 2005; Ladouceur, Rheaume, & Aublet, 1997; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; 
Radomsky, Rachman, & Hammond, 2001; Shafran, 1997; van den Hout & Kindt, 2004). To 
summarize, deliberate increases in responsibility are followed by substantial increases in 
compulsive checking. These results have been found in patients with OCD (Arntz et al., 2007; 














(Haring, 2005; Ladouceur, Leger, Rheaume, & Dube, 1996). In the absence of significant levels 
of responsibility, minimal or no checking occurs (Haring, 2005). 
 There is also consistent empirical support for the proposal that compulsive checking in 
OCD is maintained by the following self-perpetuating mechanism: that checking reduces 
confidence in memory which then increases checking and so on (Rachman, 2002; Radomsky et 
al., 2010). In a series of well-controlled experiments, van den Hout and Kindt (2003a, 2003b) 
found that non-clinical participants instructed to repeatedly check a virtual gas stove reported 
significantly reduced vividness and confidence in their memory for gas rings of the stove that 
were checked. Importantly, memory accuracy did not differ between groups. This relationship 
between checking and reduced memory confidence has been replicated using a real (rather than 
virtual) stove (Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006) and in a clinical sample (Boschen & 
Vuksanovic, 2007). In a further extension of the stove-checking task, Coles, Radomsky, and 
Horng (2006) manipulated the number of checks performed on this task and found that even 
relatively low numbers of checks could decrease memory confidence. More recently, Alcolado 
and Radomsky (2011) manipulated beliefs about memory and examined the consequent effects 
on urges to check. Participants led to believe that their memories were poor or faulty reported 
significantly greater urges to check compared to participants led to believe that their memories 
were excellent; these experiments led to the preliminary development of cognitive-behavioural 
strategies to target negative beliefs about memory and enhance memory confidence (Alcolado & 
Radomsky, 2016). Together, this research suggests that trategies that help patients achieve an 















 To this end, we have developed a cognitively-based treatment package targeting 
compulsive checking (described in Radomsky et al., 2010 and in the Methods section). This 
treatment follows from the cognitive theory of compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002) and 
emphasizes interventions (particularly behavioural experiments) targeting the components 
described above, including inflated responsibility and the self-perpetuating mechanism of 
memory distrust. Behavioural experiments are a cognitively-driven treatment strategy in which 
patients are asked to conduct an experiment in which t ey alter their behaviour in order to 
acquire new information about some aspect of their problem. These are arguably different from 
behavioural treatment strategies for OCD such as exposure and response prevention (ERP; 
Franklin & Foa, 2011), which involves repeatedly exposing the patient to their obsessional 
stimuli (e.g., inappropriate sexual thoughts, contaminants) while encouraging them to not engage 
in their compulsions (e.g., counting backwards, washing their hands) for prolonged periods of 
time, with the primary goal of helping the patient habituate to their obsessional anxiety and/or to 
facilitate inhibitory learning (Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014). Compared 
to ERP, behavioural experiments primarily emphasize the acquisition of helpful information to 
test the validity of a (maladaptive) belief, rather than habituation to anxiety. As such, behavioural 
experiments need not be carried out repeatedly, and are typically shorter than exposure exercises 
(Bennett-Levy et al., 2004), which may be more acceptable for patients. Although the 
intervention strategies described in Radomsky et al. (2010) are theoretically-, and empirically-
based, there is a need for them to be evidence-based. 
 Most research examining the effectiveness of specific interventions do so in randomized 
controlled trials where the outcomes of participants receiving one treatment are compared against 














this type of components analysis is common in treatm nt research for OCD and other 
psychological disorders. Although this type of compnents analysis can assess the effectiveness 
(i.e., symptom reduction) and acceptability of a group of intervention strategies not shared by the 
treatments being compared, it does not speak to whether or not an individual intervention 
strategy actually modifies its intended target when it is introduced.  This represents a novel way 
to assess the effectiveness of an intervention with a focus on the nature and timing of proposed 
mechanisms underlying the intervention. Few studies have examined this facet of intervention 
effectiveness, even though most cognitive and behavioural treatment programs described in 
randomized controlled trials are structured into discernible modules (typically centred on specific 
intervention strategies), which are delivered at similar times across all participants receiving the 
treatment. In honour of Arnoud Arntz’s outstanding contributions to our understanding of 
experimental psychopathology, and of critical psychological mechanisms underlying both the 
expression and treatment of OCD, we are delighted to report on our findings based on a single-
case design approach to the assessment of how and hen responsibility and memory confidence 
change during a 12-session course of cognitive therapy for compulsive checking. 
Aims and hypotheses 
 The aim of the current study was to assess whether and when specific cognitive 
interventions targeting an inflated sense of responibility and decreased memory confidence 
(within a new cognitive therapy for compulsive checking) produced changes in their targets on a 
session-by-session basis through a multiple baseline single-case design. We first hypothesized 
that participants diagnosed with OCD who struggle with compulsive checking would experience 
significant, marked, and sustained improvements in both inflated responsibility and memory 














improvements in these components would occur when they are directly addressed in therapy. For 
our third hypothesis, we predicted that improvements i  these components over treatment would 
significantly predict reductions in time spent engaging in checking behaviour. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited through local advertisments and flyers in and around 
Montreal clinics, as well as via online ads. Thirteen individuals that met DSM-IV criteria for an 
OCD diagnosis and reported significant checking sympto s (at least one hour each day) as 
assessed by the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scal (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989), 
were enrolled in this study. Exclusion criteria forthe study were the presence of psychotic 
disorders, bipolar disorder, acute suicidality, andcurrent substance abuse. Of the 13 participants, 
1 was removed from the study due to alcohol abuse that began after the commencement of 
treatment, 1 was removed due to washing/cleaning symptoms that exceeded the distress caused 
by the checking symptoms. To minimize the potential influence of order effects on the 
interpretation of our results, an additional 2 participants were removed from the statistical 
analyses due to the therapists administering the treatment in a different sequence/order. 
Participants received financial compensation for the assessment sessions they attended (i.e., 
baseline, post-treatment, and 1 month follow-up). Unusually, none of the participants was taking 
any medication at the beginning and/or during the sudy. The study was approved by the 
institution’s ethics board, and participants provided informed consent to participate in the study. 















 Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, diNardo, & 
Barlow, 1994). This semi-structured interview assesses a variety of current lifetime symptoms 
associated with anxiety and other (e.g., mood, somat form, substance abuse, psychotic) disorders 
(including OCD), according to DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The 
ADIS-IV has been widely used in both clinical and research contexts and it has been 
demonstrated to have good to excellent inter-rater reliability when assessing depression (κ = 
0.67) and OCD (κ = 0.85) (Brown, diNardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001). All interviewers on 
the ADIS-IV had an undergraduate degree in psychology and/or were completing graduate level 
studies in clinical psychology. Interviewers received rigorous training on the ADIS-IV and were 
required to match with another interviewer’s primary nd secondary diagnoses (as well as 
severity ratings) made on 3 training videos and 3 live interviews conducted with actual 
participants. These interviews were administered under the supervision of the first author (ASR), 
who is a trained clinical psychologist. Interviewers were also blind to the treatment processes 
that were being investigated in the current study. 
 Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989). This 10-
item clinician-administered measure consists of two subscales, which assess the severity of 
participants’ obsessions and compulsions, respectively. Subscale scores are summed to derive a 
total Y-BOCS score. The Y-BOCS has been shown to have excellent inter-rater reliability (all 
intra-class correlations > 0.86 for the total Y-BOCS score and for each item), as well as good 
convergent and divergent validity (Goodman et al., 1989). The same interviewers on the ADIS-
IV administered the Y-BOCS after receiving rigorous training on using the instrument. 
 Daily monitoring forms. Between the date of the intake assessment and the da e of the 1 














checking that day (in minutes) and to rate the following on a 0 to 100 scale: severity of doubt, 
feelings of responsibility, probability/likelihood of harm coming to themselves or a loved one, 
severity of harm that could come to themselves or a l ved one, and confidence in their memory 
(‘How confident are you in your memory today?’). For the purposes of the current study, only 
ratings of time spent checking, feelings of responsibility, and memory confidence were 
considered. 
Procedure 
 Participants were screened by telephone and if eligible, were invited to Concordia 
University for the first assessment approximately one week later. During this session, 
participants completed the full ADIS-IV and Y-BOCS with a trained assessor, as well as the 
other measures included in this study1. Participants were also given a monitoring booklet 
(containing the daily monitoring forms described above) to be filled in until the first treatment 
session (i.e., the baseline assessment period), throug out treatment, and until the 1 month post-
treatment follow-up assessment. At the end of the baseline assessment period, participants 
received 12 weeks of cognitive-behaviour therapy for compulsive checking by two doctoral level 
therapists (LG and JS) who were supervised by the first author (ASR). Each session was video 
recorded. 
 Treatment description. The treatment closely followed the protocol described in 
Radomsky et al. (2010) in a 12-session format with the first 10 sessions occurring weekly, and 
the last two sessions at a tapered frequency of 10 days to 2 weeks apart. This treatment followed 
a cognitive approach with the complete absence of ERP. Emphasis was placed on addressing 
                                                 
1 The Y-BOCS was also administered during an assessment session at mid-treatment (i.e., immediately following 
Session 6), one week following the last session (Session 12), and at 1 month post-treatment follow-up. Please note 
that the primary outcome data for this trial, which includes the Y-BOCS, will be reported in a separate manuscript, 














beliefs about responsibility, memory, threat, and those related to the personal significance of 
checking symptoms (Rachman, 1997, 1998, 2003). To confirm adherence to treatment 
procedures, therapists were supervised weekly by the first author (ASR), and all sessions were 
videotaped and later reviewed to ensure treatment fidelity. Therapist competence was not 
assessed. 
 Each session began with a review of the monitoring information completed since the 
previous session. The first two sessions of the treatm nt were introductory, and included 
psychoeducation about compulsive checking in OCD, as well as the collaborative development 
of an idiosyncratic model of the participant’s checking problem based on the cognitive model of 
compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002). Sessions 3 to 5 included a focus on the modification of 
beliefs about inflated responsibility. Different responsibility-reducing strategies were used such 
as the classic ‘responsibility pie chart’ (estimating and allocating responsibility between the 
patient and other parties for preventing a negative outcome; Whittal & McLean, 1999), the 
continuum technique (depicting on a spectrum the pati nt’s and other individuals’ appraisals or 
actions), conducting surveys to collect (accurate) information from relevant people, and 
responsibility contracts where responsibility is temporarily transferred to another person (e.g., 
roommate, partner, therapist; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Radomsky et al., 2001; Shafran, 1997). 
Sessions 6 and 7 focused on recalculating the probability of harm and the severity of harm 
(described in Radomsky et al., 2010). Sessions 8 and 9 focused on negative beliefs about 
memory which includes addressing memory confidence (se Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011, 
2016). Exercises and behavioural experiments about the consequences of repeated checking (as 
described in Radomsky et al., 2010 and following from van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a,b; 














and corrective information about their memories (based on Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011) were 
used. The next sessions focused on consolidating and summarizing the work done in previous 
sessions, attending mostly to the personal significance of any intrusive thoughts and generalizing 
treatment gains to related yet not necessarily targe ed domains, such as guilt (Mancini & 
Gangemi, 2004), hypervigilance (Wiggs, Martin, Altemus, & Murphy, 1996), self-doubting 
(Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011), reassurance seeking , and mental checking (Radomsky & 
Alcolado, 2010). The final treatment session focused on relapse prevention. All sessions were 
followed by an assigned behavioural experiment as the between-session homework activity. 
Statistical analyses 
 Multilevel modelling was used to test all our hypotheses. To examine our first 
hypothesis, that participants would experience significant and sustained improvements in both 
inflated responsibility and memory confidence, we conducted a multilevel model with the fixed 
model part consisting of dummy-coded variables defining comparisons between baseline (coded 
0) and post-treatment (coded 1) and between baseline (coded 0) and 1 month follow-up (coded 
1). 
 To examine our second hypothesis, that improvements in inflated responsibility and 
memory confidence would occur when they are directly addressed in therapy, we conducted 
another multilevel model comparing the linear change in ratings of responsibility feelings and 
memory confidence both before and during/after the treatment sessions when these cognitive 
targets were specifically addressed (also known as an interrupted time series analysis). The fixed 
model part consisted of a) an effect-coded variable defining a general linear time effect starting 
with 0 indicating the baseline assessment period, 1 to 12 indicating the average of the 














measurements in total); b) a dummy-coded variable defining the sessions and assessment periods 
prior to when these targets were addressed (coded 0) and the sessions and assessment periods 
during/after these targets were addressed (coded 1); and c) an interaction term defined by the 
product of a) and b). The random model part consisted of a random intercept and slope to allow 
for between-subject variation in time effects, of which the within-subject covariance structure 
was defined as heterogeneous first-order autoregressive (ARH1). This model was repeated for 
the whole sample (Model 1) and for each participant (Models 3 to 11). 
 A separate multilevel model (Model 2) was conducted to understand the interaction term 
obtained from Model 1 for ratings of responsibility and memory confidence (i.e., simple slope 
analysis). That is, we wanted to examine the linear ch nge in these cognitive targets within the 
period before these were specifically targeted (pre-int rvention) and within the period 
during/after these were specifically targeted (post-intervention). For this model, the fixed part 
consisted of effect-coded and centred variables indicating general linear time effects within pre-
intervention and within post-intervention. To illustrate, for the time-within-pre-intervention 
variable, the 3 measurements of responsibility feelings prior to the sessions when these were 
specifically targeted would be coded -1, 0, 1 and all other measurements would be coded 0. For 
the time-within-post-intervention variable, the 11 measurements of responsibility feelings 
during/after the sessions when these were specifically targeted would be coded -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and all other measurements would be coded 0. The random model part was the 
same as in Model 1. 
 To examine our third hypothesis, that improvements in inflated responsibility and 
memory confidence would significantly predict reductions in time spent engaging in checking 














change in responsibility ratings and memory confidence over treatment. The fixed model part 
consisted of responsibility or memory confidence ratings. The random model part consisted of a 
random intercept and slope to allow for between-subject variation in responsibility/memory 
confidence ratings, of which the within-subject covariance structure was defined as ARH1. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1 – Treatment effectiveness in improving feelings of responsibility and memory 
confidence 
 Means, standard deviations, and comparison statistics of the assessment periods on 
feelings of responsibility and memory confidence ar presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. 
Multilevel modelling showed a significant reduction in responsibility ratings between the 
baseline and post-treatment (p < 0.001; 95% confidence interval = 27.93 to 57.61), and a 
significant reduction between baseline and 1 month follow-up (p < 0.001; 95% confidence 
interval = 32.50 to 60.22). We similarly found a significant increase in memory confidence 
between baseline and post-treatment (p = 0.05; 95% confidence interval = -50.26 to -0.63), and a 
significant increase between baseline and 1 month follow-up (p = 0.04; 95% confidence interval 
= -52.05 to -3.44). 
Hypothesis 2 – Linear change in cognitive targets before and after they were specifically 
addressed 
 Feelings of responsibility. Figure 1 shows the aggregate and individual responsibility 
ratings for the 9 participants averaged daily across 2 weeks of the baseline assessment period, the 
days following each treatment session, and at 1 month f llow-up. Visual inspection suggests 
decreases in responsibility ratings for all participants during/after beliefs about responsibility 














time-by-intervention interaction was a marginally significant predictor of feelings of 
responsibility for the whole sample (p = 0.07; Model 1). Together with the simple slopes analysis 
(Table 4, Model 2), it suggests that the lack of linear change in responsibility ratings over the 
measurements prior to the responsibility intervention (β = 0.45, p = 0.91; 95% confidence 
interval = -7.44 to 8.33) changed to a significant decrease in responsibility ratings over time 
following the introduction of the intervention (β = -4.56, p < 0.001; 95% confidence interval = -
6.35 to -2.77). 
 Confidence in memory. Figure 2 shows the aggregate and individual ratings of memory 
confidence for the 9 participants averaged daily across 2 weeks of the baseline period, the days 
following each treatment session, and at 1 month follow-up. Visual inspection suggests increases 
in memory confidence for 6 out of 9 participants during/after this cognitive component was 
specifically targeted in sessions 8 and 9. Multileve  modelling (see Table 5) revealed that the 
time-by-intervention interaction was a significant predictor of memory confidence for the whole 
sample (p = 0.01; Model 1). Together with the simple slopes analysis (Table 5, Model 2), it 
suggests that the lack of linear change in memory cnfidence over the measurements prior to the 
memory confidence intervention (β = 0.43, p = 0.38; 95% confidence interval = -0.53 to 1.38) 
changed to a significant increase in memory confidece over time following the introduction of 
the intervention (β = 1.7, p = 0.02; 95% confidence interval = 0.24 to 3.17). 
Hypothesis 3 – Change in cognitive targets predicting changes in compulsive checking 
 For the whole sample, multilevel modelling revealed that reductions in responsibility 
feelings over the course of the study significantly predicted reductions in time spent checking (β 














revealed that increases in memory over the course of the study significantly predicted reductions 
in time spent checking (β = -1.57, p < 0.001; 95% confidence interval = -2.14 to -1.00). 
Discussion 
 Our primary aim in this study was to assess the degree to which targets of cognitive 
therapy for compulsive checking were addressed during t eatment, with particular emphasis on 
when changes in these targets took place. Compulsive checking is one of the most common 
forms of OCD and is associated with high levels of anxiety and distress (Foa et al., 2005). 
Although several studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of cognitive therapy in reducing 
symptoms of OCD (Cottraux et al., 2001; Ost, Havnen, Hansen, & Kvale, 2015), to the best of 
our knowledge, none have focused on compulsive checking specifically, and aside from a robust 
and influential literature on sudden gains in CBT (e.g., Aderka et al., 2012; Norton, Klenck, & 
Barrera, 2010; Tang & DeRubeis, 1999), few if any studies have assessed the timing of cognitive 
change during therapy. Therefore, the purpose of the current study was to investigate whether 
specific cognitive interventions addressing an inflated sense of responsibility and decreased 
memory confidence, two cognitive constructs empirically shown to maintain compulsive 
checking, produced changes in these domains whenthe interventions were provided. 
 We first hypothesized that participants who struggle with compulsive checking would 
experience significant, marked, and sustained improvements in both inflated responsibility and 
memory confidence. Our findings supported this prediction such that participants experienced a 
significant improvement (with large effect sizes) in these cognitive components immediately 















 Importantly, we found general support for our second hypothesis such that changes in 
these cognitive constructs occurred when they were exp cted to happen. That is, reductions in 
feelings of responsibility and increases in memory confidence were observed when the 
interventions targeting these were introduced, and not before. Furthermore, improvements in 
feelings of responsibility and memory confidence were relatively consistent from the moment 
they were targeted up until one month after the end of treatment. Notably in both cases, the non-
significant time effect in our multilevel models suggests that the observed changes in feelings of 
responsibility and memory confidence were not simply due to the passage of time or common 
therapy factors, but due to the introduction of specific interventions targeting these cognitive 
components. 
 In a more detailed analysis, approximately half of the participants did not show 
significant improvements in these components when t interventions were introduced. A visual 
inspection of these participants’ data revealed that in the case of feelings of responsibility, 
participants who did not experience significant intervention-related changes reported moderately 
low feelings of responsibility at baseline (e.g., 50 – 60/100), and so any gains received from the 
cognitive intervention may have been minimal (i.e., floor effect). Similarly, a ceiling effect may 
have been observed for participants who did not experience significant intervention-related 
changes in memory confidence due to them reporting moderately high memory confidence at 
baseline (e.g., 70 – 90/100). The therapy followed the same session structure for each participant 
in order to control for any order effects on result. Although there are strengths to this type of 
design, this could have affected the results for some participants as they may have benefited from 
an idiosyncratic order of sessions which prioritizes targeting their most maladaptive belief. This 














research settings and future studies could allow for m re flexibility in the session order 
determined by the participants’ most relevant concerns. However, as raised earlier in the 
Methods section, while this would allow for a more ecologically valid examination of overall 
treatment effectiveness, changes in session order may introduce confounds in our interpretation 
of the specific timing of cognitive change (i.e., whether these change when they are addressed in 
therapy). 
 Importantly, the discussion above highlights that t e theory-driven interventions in our 
treatment could be further refined by accounting for the particular profile of cognitive beliefs 
within each participant, which can be heterogeneous ven within a largely accepted and well-
established OCD domain such as compulsive checking. Future studies could thus examine 
whether participants with varying levels of responsibility and memory beliefs would benefit from 
a specific intervention order or an entirely different intervention altogether. For example, an 
individual with equally elevated levels of responsibility and memory beliefs might benefit more 
from a behavioural experiment that simultaneously targets both (e.g., testing predictions around 
the accuracy of their memory for having turned off their stove while challenging their personal 
responsibility for ensuring that it is turned off). Indeed, in addition to identifying when cognitive 
change occurs, research in this field should move twards understanding for whom these 
interventions work best. 
 Finally, there was also support for our third hypothesis, such that improvements in these 
cognitive components significantly predicted reductions in time spent engaging in checking 
behaviour. These findings are consistent with a study by Alcolado and Radomsky (2016), who 
demonstrated that the same 2-session intervention targeting maladaptive beliefs about memory 














suggestions that these cognitive components can and should be targeted in treatments for 
compulsive checking (e.g., Radomsky et al., 2010; Shafran, Radomsky, Coughtrey, & Rachman, 
2013). 
Limitations and future directions 
 The small sample size in the current study limits our ability to generalize our results. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to mention that since the treatment delivered in this study 
incorporated new interventions, it is necessary to first assess its effectiveness and refine them in 
a small and controlled group of participants before conducting a larger scale randomized 
controlled trial. Future studies should therefore include a larger sample size to replicate the 
findings of this study. In addition, we propose that investigations of the timing of cognitive, 
behavioural and emotional change could contribute sbstantially to an understanding of key 
mechanisms of change underlying evidence-based psychological treatments. 
Conclusion 
 Our findings suggest that interventions targeting beliefs about responsibility and memory 
are effective in modifying these and at reducing compulsive checking in OCD. Using a multiple 
baseline single case design approach, we identified when change occurred in these cognitive 
components throughout the therapy. Randomized controlled trials with larger sample sizes are 
now warranted to assess cognitive and behavioural symptom change on a broader scale. 
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Participant Sociodemographic Characteristics (N = 9) 
Variable  Mean (SD) / Number (Percentage) 
Age Range (19 – 56) 32.89 (11.70) 
Gender Female 4 (44.4) 
Male 5 (55.6) 
Civil status Single 7 (77.8) 
Married or common law 2 (22.2) 
Educational level University degree 2 (22.2) 
College diploma 6 (66.7) 
High school diploma 1 (11.1) 
Ethnicity Caucasian 5 (55.6) 
South Asian 1 (11.1) 
Multi-Ethnic 1 (11.1) 
Indo-Canadian 1 (11.1) 
Middle Eastern 1 (11.1) 
Employment status Full-time employee 3 (33.3) 
Part-time employee 3 (33.3) 
Student 2 (22.2) 
Unemployed 1 (11.1) 
OCD Severity (Y-
BOCS) 
Obsessions 11.33 (2.95) 
Compulsions  12.44 (2.69) 
Total  23.78 (5.16) 
Primary ADIS 
diagnosis 
OCD 8 (88.9) 
Specific Phobia 1 (11.1) 
Secondary ADIS 
diagnosis 
OCD 1 (11.1) 
Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia 2 (22.2) 
Social Phobia 1 (11.1) 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 1 (11.1) 
Dysthymia 1 (11.1) 
Tertiary ADIS 
diagnosis 
Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia 1 (11.1) 
Social Phobia 2 (22.2) 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 2 (22.2) 
Dysthymia 1 (11.1) 
Quaternary ADIS 
diagnosis 
Specific Phobia 2 (22.2) 
Major Depressive Disorder 1 (11.1) 
Dysthymia 1 (11.1) 
Quinary ADIS 
diagnosis 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 1 (11.1) 















Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics of Comparisons between Assessment Periods on 











M SD t (1, 9) 95% CI t (1, 9) 95% CI 
Baseline 66.02 16.45 
6.52*** 27.93 , 57.61 7.57*** 32.50 , 60.22 Post-treatment 23.25 17.76 
Follow-up 19.67 13.79 
Note. *** p < 0.001. 
Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics of Comparisons between Assessment Periods on 












M SD t (1, 9) 95% CI t (1, 9) 95% CI 
Baseline 57.37 31.82 
-2.32* -50.26 , -0.63 -2.58* -52.05 , -3.44 Post-treatment 82.81 19.44 
Follow-up 85.11 14.23 















Results of Multilevel Modelling – Responsibility Rating (N = 9) 




Intercept 67.00 7.09 12.95 9.45 <0.001 51.68 , 82.33 
Time 0.45 2.77 116.08 0.16 0.87 -5.03 , 5.93 




-5.01 2.73 108 -1.84 0.07 -10.42 , 0.40 











-4.56 0.90 123 -5.05 <0.001 -6.35 , -2.77 
          







1 -13.51 5.79 10 -2.33 0.04 -26.40 , -0.61 
2 5.54 1.48 10 3.75 0.004 2.25 , 8.83 
3 -6.56 7.16 10 -0.92 0.38 -22.52 , 9.40 
4 -5.88 1.27 10 -4.65 0.001 -8.70 , -3.06 
5 -21.93 9.80 10 -2.24 0.05 -43.76 , -0.09 
6 -2.42 5.55 10 -0.44 0.67 -14.79 , 9.95 
7 -1.17 3.96 10 -0.30 0.77 -10.00 , 7.65 
8 -5.90 11.65 10 -0.51 0.62 -31.86 , 20.07 
9 6.75 3.29 10 2.05 0.07 -0.57 , 14.07 
Note. For Models 1 and 3 to 11, predictors were coded as follows – effect coding for Time (0, 1, 2, … 13) with 0 for 
the baseline assessment period, 1 to 12 indicating the average of the measurements taken daily after each session, 
and 13 for the 1 month follow-up; dummy coding for Intervention (1, 0) such that the sessions and assessment 
periods prior to when responsibility was addressed w re coded 0 and the sessions and assessment periods 
during/after the sessions when responsibility was addressed were coded 1. Model 1 intercept variance (BS) was 















Results of Multilevel Modelling – Confidence in Memory (N = 9) 




Intercept 56.73 12.22 9.21 4.64 0.001 29.17 , 84.28 
Time 0.85 1.11 12.85 0.77 0.46 -1.55 , 3.26 




2.55 0.92 108 2.77 0.01 0.73 , 4.38 











1.70 0.74 123 2.30 0.02 0.24 , 3.17 
          







1 -1.02 1.29 10 -0.79 0.45 -3.89 , 1.86 
2 1.01 0.48 10 2.13 0.06 -0.05 , 2.07 
3 0.13 0.47 10 0.28 0.78 -0.92 , 1.19 
4 -1.09 1.62 10 -0.68 0.52 -4.70 , 2.52 
5 12.67 4.70 10 2.69 0.02 2.19 , 23.14 
6 -1.13 0.68 10 -1.67 0.13 -2.63 , 0.38 
7 -1.26 1.52 10 -0.83 0.43 -4.65 , 2.13 
8 9.17 0.85 10 10.83 <0.001 7.29 , 11.06 
9 4.49 0.66 10 6.76 <0.001 3.01 , 5.97 
Note. For Models 1 and 3 to 11, predictors were coded as follows – effect coding for Time (0, 1, 2, … 13) with 0 for 
the baseline assessment period, 1 to 12 indicating the average of the measurements taken daily after each session, 
and 13 for the 1 month follow-up; dummy coding for Intervention (1, 0) such that the sessions and assessment 
periods prior to when memory confidence was addressed were coded 0 and the sessions and assessment periods 
during/after the sessions when memory confidence was addressed were coded 1. Model 1 intercept variance (BS) 














   
   
   




Figure 1. Ratings of responsibility averaged daily across 2 weeks of the baseline assessment 
period, the days following each treatment session, and at 1 month follow-up for all participants. 
The white circles indicate the sessions where beliefs about responsibility was directly targeted 

















   
   


















Figure 2. Ratings of confidence in memory averaged daily across 2 weeks of the baseline 
assessment period, the days following each treatment sessions, and at 1 month follow-up for all 
participants. The white circles indicate the sessions where confidence in memory was directly 


















We provided 9 participants with 12 sessions of cognitive therapy for OCD. 
Participants monitored responsibility beliefs, memory confidence, and checking behaviour daily. 
We found that responsibility and memory confidence changed when they were targeted in therapy. 
These changes were predictive of reductions in checking behaviour. 
This methodology may help to focus on treatment mechanisms and their timing. 
